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Tribute to Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
The editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review respectfully 
dedicate this issue to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
 
 
Jonathan L. Entin† 
A Tribute to Ruth Bader Ginsburg:  
A Law Clerk’s Reflections 
 
I was privileged to know Ruth Bader Ginsburg for more than forty 
years. I was one of her earliest law clerks, and we stayed in periodic 
touch after that. The editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review 
have invited me to provide a few personal reflections. I am honored by 
this request and hope that what follows does honor to Justice Ginsburg 
and fulfills the editors’ expectations. The discussion proceeds in three 
stages: first, I will explain why I applied for the clerkship; next, I will 
describe some aspects of the clerkship and my continuing connections 
with her; finally, I will offer some observations on her judicial record 
and her place in our nation’s law and history. 
I 
When I started law school I had no interest in clerking. But several 
of my professors encouraged me, with increasing levels of insistence, to 
throw my hat into the ring. I applied to Justice Ginsburg because she 
was a distinguished legal scholar who also directed a remarkable 
litigation campaign that resulted in a series of Supreme Court rulings 
that transformed the law of gender discrimination. 
Let’s begin with Professor Ginsburg, the scholar. She made her 
mark early with significant articles on complex procedural subjects in 
leading law reviews1 as well as a highly regarded book and several other 
 
†  David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University. The author clerked for Justice Ginsburg in 1981–1982, when 
she was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. Portions of this tribute appeared in the Cardozo Law Review. 
Thanks to the editors of both journals for allowing the overlapping 
materials to be published in their pages. 
1. See, e.g., Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and 
Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L. 
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articles on Swedish law.2 Indeed, her work on Swedish law led to her 
receiving an honorary degree from Lund University that was presented 
to her by King Gustaf VI of Sweden; she hung the diploma on the wall 
of her chambers. But she also published numerous works on 
constitutional issues3 and coauthored the first law school casebook on 
gender discrimination.4 
Those latter projects grew out of her work as a lawyer, leading an 
effort to combat the gender discrimination that was pervasive in our 
law. When she began her work, the Supreme Court had never in its 
entire history found a sex-based law to be unconstitutional. But the 
Court had decided quite a few cases that rejected challenges to such 
laws. For example, in 1873 the Court upheld the exclusion of women 
from membership in the bar.5 One of the opinions in that case, written 
by a supposedly progressive justice, said that women were too fragile 
to be lawyers: “The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to 
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law 
of the Creator.”6 Sometimes the Court refused to take gender-
discrimination claims seriously. In a 1948 case challenging a Michigan 
ban on women working as bartenders, the Court said that “to state the 
[legal] question is in effect to answer it.”7 And as late as 1961, the Court 
 
Rev. 798 (1969); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Special Findings and Jury Unanimity 
in the Federal Courts, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 256 (1965). 
2. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Anders Bruzelius, Civil 
Procedure in Sweden (1965); Ruth Ginsburg, The Jury and the 
Nämnd: Some Observations on Judicial Control of Lay Triers of Civil 
Proceedings in the United States and Sweden, 48 Cornell L.Q. 253 
(1963); Ruth Ginsburg & Anders Bruzelius, Professional Legal Assistance 
in Sweden, 11 Int’l & Compar. L.Q. 997 (1962). 
3. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 1 (1975); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the 
Constitution, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451 (1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual 
Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 
Wash. U. L.Q. 161; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 
301 (1979). 
4. Kenneth M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Herma Hill Kay, 
Sex-Based Discrimination: Text, Cases, and Materials (1974). 
5. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
6. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412 (1908) (upholding a statute limiting women’s working hours due to 
females’ physical frailty and the potential harm to their reproductive 
capacity arising from long hours on the job). 
7. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948). 
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upheld the effective exclusion of women from jury service because they 
were “the center of home and family life.”8 
That changed in the 1971 case of Reed v. Reed,9 which struck down 
an Idaho law that preferred men over women as administrators of 
estates. Professor Ginsburg did not argue that case, but she wrote the 
brief. This seemingly small case—and a tragic one, involving the 
aftermath of a teenager’s suicide10—was the first time that the Supreme 
Court found any form of gender discrimination to be unconstitutional.11 
She soon built on that foundation in a series of cases that she argued 
and others in which she wrote amicus briefs and often advised the 
lawyers who did argue. 
Her first oral argument at the Supreme Court came in Frontiero v. 
Richardson,12 decided in 1973, which struck down a discriminatory Air 
Force rule about housing and similar benefits: married male officers 
could automatically qualify for those benefits, but married female 
officers could get them only if they could show that their husbands 
depended on them for more than half their support. 
Two years later, she won the case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,13 
which struck down a provision of the Social Security Act that gave 
benefits to the widowed mother of small children but denied them to 
widowers who had small children. Stephen Wiesenfeld’s wife died in 
childbirth, leaving him to raise their son alone. Justice Ginsburg always 
said that Wiesenfeld was her favorite client; he testified at her Supreme 
Court confirmation hearing, and in 2014 she performed Stephen 
Wiesenfeld’s second marriage—with his son Jason in attendance (she 
also had performed Jason’s marriage some years earlier).14 
 
8. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). 
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
10. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1185, 1203 n.107 (1992). 
11. Even before Reed, she and her husband, a distinguished tax lawyer, 
successfully challenged a gender-based provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code, although the court of appeals did not issue its ruling for 18 months 
after oral arguments. Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972); 
see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gillian Metzger & Abbe Gluck, A Conversation 
with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 Colum. J. Gender & L. 6, 9–10 
(2013). 
12. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
13. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
14. See Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Performs Wedding for Man in 1970s Case 
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And in 1976, she advised the lawyers and wrote an important 
amicus brief in Craig v. Boren,15 which established intermediate 
scrutiny as the constitutional standard for gender-discrimination cases. 
This was an unusual case, because it involved a state law that required 
men to be twenty-one before they could buy low-alcohol beer but 
allowed women to buy the same product at eighteen. 
There were other cases along these lines,16 and by the end of the 
1970s the Supreme Court had made clear that gender discrimination 
was no longer trivial but instead required a substantial legal justifi–
cation. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was primarily responsible for this 
dramatic transformation. Not only did she make creative and ultimately 
persuasive legal arguments, but she also devised a brilliant litigation 
strategy. She proceeded incrementally, sometimes with male plaintiffs 
and sometimes with married couples. She understood that she had to 
persuade nine middle-aged and older men to take gender discrimination 
claims seriously, and she recognized that they would be more open to 
doing that if she could show them that traditional notions of gender 
roles affected men as well as women. 
II 
I did everything wrong in applying for my clerkship with Justice 
Ginsburg during my second year in law school. Based on incomplete 
information, I assumed that she was already on the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit so sent my application 
to her in Washington. Some time later, I got a nice letter from her—on 
her Columbia Law School letterhead—explaining that her nomination 
had only recently been sent to the Senate. But she also asked me for 
more information. After I sent that material, she asked for more, so I 
sent that. Then she invited me to interview at her New York home, 
even before she was confirmed. 
When I arrived shortly after 9:30 a.m. on June 18, 1980, her son 
welcomed me by saying: “I was going to ask why you want to clerk for 
an unconfirmed judge, but I can’t do that. The Senate just confirmed 
 
15. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
16. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating a 
provision of the Social Security Act that denied survivor’s benefits to 
widowers unless they could prove that they relied on their wives for 
more than half of their support but automatically allowed widows to 
obtain survivor’s benefits); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632 (1974) (striking down a rule that required pregnant teachers to stop 
working after their fourth month). Professor Ginsburg argued Goldfarb, 
and she both advised the lawyers for the teachers and submitted an 
amicus brief in LaFleur. For more details about LaFleur, see Jonathan 
L. Entin, Sidney Picker: Legal Architect, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
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her a few minutes ago.” So I was the first person she saw outside of her 
family after receiving that news. Our conversation was repeatedly 
interrupted as she took congratulatory phone calls. Eventually she 
made me the offer, which I happily accepted. 
Although my clerkship would not begin for another year, she made 
sure that I received all the slip opinions from the D.C. Circuit so that 
I would know what the court had been up to when I started. She even 
welcomed my having caught a faulty citation in one of her opinions.17 
Justice Ginsburg was a superb judge and a great boss. She didn’t 
have formal rules. For example, her office manager told the previous 
clerks that they couldn’t leave work while the judge was still there. 
Justice Ginsburg was not a morning person—I rarely saw her before 10 
a.m. all year except on days when she heard oral arguments—and she 
worked very late. One evening around seven o’clock she came out of 
her office to get a cup of coffee and saw that all the clerks were at their 
desks. She asked why they were still there at such a late hour. They 
told her what the office manager had said about not leaving while she 
was still in chambers. The judge laughed and said that she had no such 
rule. In fact, she only expected her clerks to do excellent work and do 
it on time. There was no dress code (although of course we all dressed 
appropriately), nor were there formal working hours (except that we 
had to be in the courtroom when the cases for which we had prepared 
bench memos were argued). 
That captures the essence of what made Justice Ginsburg such a 
wonderful boss. She wasn’t a schmoozer, but she treated us like 
professionals. She also made clear that she wrote her own opinions. Her 
name went on them, and she wanted them to reflect her own voice. She 
eagerly shared drafts and often incorporated suggestions from the 
clerks, but for the most part our writing consisted of memos. Toward 
the end of the year, she would let us do the first draft of an opinion. 
Our manuscripts came back covered with her editorial comments. She 
gave us more latitude with the short memoranda that were issued as 
unpublished opinions, but even there her style was evident. She also 
asked us to review drafts from other judges in cases in which she sat 
but was not writing, and she shared at least some of our comments with 
the authoring judge. 
When we weren’t helping her with opinions, we prepared her for 
the next round of oral arguments. Each judge sat for several days each 
month, typically in panels of three. The clerks divided the cases that 
would be argued at each sitting and wrote bench memos on every case 
before it was argued. Those memos provided an overview of the issues, 
what had happened before the case got to the court of appeals, and the 
parties’ arguments. We focused in particular on whether those argu–
 
17. I later learned that the clerk who had worked on the case got taken to 
task for the error, but we managed to make amends before the end of his 
clerkship. 
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ments were supported by the record in the case and whether the 
authorities on which the parties relied actually supported their claims. 
You would be surprised how often the authorities had to be stretched 
to support the arguments for which they were cited. Then a few days 
before the argument, she would meet with each of us to discuss “our” 
cases. 
My first bench memo was on a complicated election law case.18 I 
approached the project with more than usual trepidation. My co-clerks, 
Gary Harris and Monica Wagner, had been her students at Columbia, 
and Monica also had been the judge’s research assistant. I had no 
connection with Columbia and therefore had to prove myself, so I wrote 
a thirty-five-page memo that covered every imaginable aspect of the 
case. After reading it, she told me: “Don’t do that again.” My heart 
sank. Then she congratulated me on my thorough work but warned 
that I would never sleep if I wrote such detailed memos on every case. 
Everything went fine from there. 
Another case that stands out was a libel suit against the 
Washington Post.19 The case reached us on an arcane procedural issue, 
not the merits, but the briefs were, to put it mildly, vitriolic. After we 
discussed the legal issues relating to voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judge remarked about the 
harsh tone of the briefs. I offered a hypothesis: One of the plaintiffs was 
George Preston Marshall, Jr., whose father was the founder and 
longtime owner of what used to be known as the Washington Redskins. 
The Post was represented by Williams & Connolly, whose senior 
partner, Edward Bennett Williams, owned the Redskins after Marshall, 
Sr. Moreover, Williams detested Marshall, Sr., whom he rightly 
regarded as an unreconstructed racist—the Redskins were the last NFL 
team to have a Black player—and the feeling was mutual. I suggested 
that the terrible personal relationship between Marshall, Sr., and 
Williams might have been reflected in the briefs. The judge listened 
attentively and then, in all seriousness, asked: “Who or what are the 
Redskins?” 
The clerk who had worked on each case would attend the oral 
arguments. We took detailed notes about the proceedings and were 
available to do quick research in the unlikely event that something 
unexpected came up during the arguments. Justice Ginsburg always 
had incisive questions that got to the heart of each case, but she was 
always respectful of the lawyers no matter how much they struggled. 
She even remained calm when one lawyer responded to one of her 
questions by asking how she would answer it, but I could almost see 
the steam coming out of her ears as she asked that hapless attorney to 
please answer the question. 
 
18. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
19. McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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Then there was the time that she led a lawyer through a series of 
questions about claim preclusion and finally told him that his argument 
was inconsistent with the position taken in the Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments. She did not say that she had helped to write the 
Restatement first as an advisor to and then as a council member of the 
American Law Institute. But it was clear that the lawyer’s goose was 
cooked regardless of the authorship issue. 
Of course, she did have views about the abilities of the lawyers who 
appeared before her. One of the cases argued on my first day in the 
courtroom involved a tiny woman who had been beaten within an inch 
of her life by a coworker at her place of employment before her shift 
started. The woman applied for worker’s compensation, but her 
application was rejected. The agency explained that she did not have 
to be at work at the time the man beat her up, so her claim did not 
arise out of or in the course of her employment. At oral argument, 
Justice Ginsburg and the other two judges repeatedly asked her 
attorney what legal error the agency had made that would allow the 
court to overturn its ruling, but the man never gave a coherent answer. 
When we got back to chambers, Justice Ginsburg said to me: “If that 
woman paid her lawyer a penny, it was too much.” 
At the end of each monthly sitting, she would serve the clerks wine 
and cheese. After the first sitting, she was mortified to discover that 
she didn’t have a corkscrew in chambers so had to borrow one from a 
colleague. When the holidays came around, she gave us very fancy 
corkscrews so that we would never be caught short. 
And she stayed in touch with us after we left her chambers. For 
many years we had annual reunions that drew almost all the former 
clerks, their spouses, and children. She was always accompanied by her 
beloved husband, Marty, a distinguished tax lawyer and professor in 
his own right who was her opposite and complement in so many ways. 
She would greet everyone individually and talk briefly with each of us, 
but Marty carried the conversation with an infinite supply of great 
stories. Sometimes one of her judicial colleagues would serve as guest of 
honor: Justice Scalia spoke at the reunion marking her tenth anniver–
sary on the bench, and he was so warmly received that he came back 
for her twentieth as well. 
But it was more than reunions. For example, I quoted Marty in one 
of my articles. He had testified at a congressional hearing on the 1982 
tax act. One of his comments appeared in boldface type on the front 
page of the Washington Post one day, and hundreds of T-shirts bearing 
that quote were distributed at the IRS. I alluded to that fact, too.20 
After reading the article, she found one of those T-shirts and sent it to 
me. I still have it. 
 
20. Jonathan L. Entin, Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel 
Law Reform, 38 Mercer L. Rev. 835, 835 & n.1 (1987). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Tribute to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
8 
I had other opportunities to see her over the years. Occasionally 
when I was in Washington for other purposes, I would have lunch with 
her. She came to the Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
one year to speak and to preside at the final round of the Dunmore 
Moot Court Competition. She brought Marty with her, and they were 
ebullient when I picked them up for dinner. They had spent the after–
noon at the Cleveland Museum of Art, which had a special exhibition 
of French art. It turned out that the show included the original of a 
painting that Marty knew about but hadn’t seen; he had represented a 
previous owner in a dispute over its value and regaled us with the story 
of the hearing at which he had eviscerated the IRS appraiser who turned 
out to know almost nothing about art. 
The last time I saw her in person was in late 2016, when the law 
school had a ceremony for alumni and faculty to be sworn in as 
members of the Supreme Court bar. That ceremony took place in the 
courtroom. Justice Ginsburg graciously agreed to speak to us after the 
ceremony, talking about other female judges who had marked the path 
for her. We had some correspondence more recently. To my enormous 
regret, I couldn’t go to Washington for the memorial activities after she 
died, but her staff arranged for those of us who couldn’t make the trip 
to participate in a virtual vigil alongside the vigil at the Court. 
III 
Let me say a few words about Justice Ginsburg’s work on the 
bench. She spent thirteen years on the D.C. Circuit. One of her 
significant cases there was Wright v. Regan,21 in which the parents of 
black children in public schools that were under desegregation orders 
claimed that the IRS had improperly granted tax exemptions to 
discriminatory private schools, which in turn made it less expensive for 
white parents to send their kids to those segregation academies and 
thereby undermined desegregation efforts. An important part of this 
long-running case took place during my clerkship at a time when the 
Reagan administration was arguing that the IRS had no legal basis for 
denying tax exemptions to the discriminatory schools. That issue was 
before the Supreme Court in another case, Bob Jones University v. 
United States,22 that the administration was trying to undercut. The 
parents filed an emergency application to keep their case alive while the 
Supreme Court was deciding the other case.23 That was one of the very 
 
21. 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737 (1984). 
22. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
23. Wright v. Regan, 49 A.F.T.R.2d ¶ 82–757 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982) 
(directing the government not to grant or restore tax-exempt status to 
private schools that had racially discriminatory admissions policies), 
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few times all year when I saw the judge before ten o’clock on a non-
argument day. 
She also wrote a superb dissent in a 1988 case—it was called In re 
Sealed Case24 in the court of appeals and Morrison v. Olson25 in the 
Supreme Court—that challenged the independent counsel law. Her 
colleagues on the court of appeals thought the law was unconstitutional, 
but the Supreme Court—in a 7–1 ruling—agreed with her and upheld 
the law. But her dissent in the court of appeals was much better 
reasoned than the majority opinion in the Supreme Court. Anticipating 
Justice Scalia’s dissent,26 she agreed that the case indeed implicated 
first principles under the Constitution, but different principles than 
Scalia invoked. For Ginsburg, the question involved preventing the 
accumulation of unchecked power in any single branch of the federal 
government.27 
Sometimes her decisions as a circuit judge went against her 
deserved reputation as a liberal. For example, she voted against 
rehearing en banc in a case where the panel had rejected a consti–
tutional challenge to the discharge of a gay Navy officer. She agreed 
with some of her colleagues that the panel opinion contained criticisms 
of Supreme Court decisions that went well beyond what was necessary 
to resolve the merits of the constitutional claim, but she emphasized 
that controlling precedent required the court of appeals to reject the 
challenge.28 And she also wrote for the D.C. Circuit in holding that 
private plaintiffs could not maintain a broad-based challenge to the 
federal government’s enforcement of civil rights protections in 
education under a wide range of statutes.29 
 
order continued in force, 49 A.F.T.R.2d ¶ 82–1081 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 
1982). 
24. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
25. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
26. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the framers “viewed 
the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee 
of a just Government”). 
27. Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 536 (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the independent counsel law was “a carefully considered 
congressional journey into the sometimes arcane realm of the separation 
of powers doctrine, more particularly, into areas the framers left 
undefined”). 
28. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1581–82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (statement 
of Ginsburg, J., on denial of rehearing en banc). 
29. Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
 The Supreme Court occasionally overturned her appellate rulings. See, 
e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), rev’g 770 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 
1985); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), rev’g Wright v. Regan, 656 
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Now for some brief remarks about her work on the Supreme Court. 
She became Justice Ginsburg in August 1993. As I mentioned, she was 
a brilliant lawyer and a shrewd strategist. And she brought that 
strategic sense to the Supreme Court, especially when she became the 
most senior member of the liberal wing in 2010. She helped to keep that 
group unified in some high-profile cases. And sometimes that meant not 
writing separately even when there was plenty to say. Take, for 
instance, Obergefell v. Hodges,30 the same-sex marriage case. That was 
a 5–4 decision in which Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. His 
opinion was unconventional in many ways, and almost certainly the 
other justices in the majority would have written it differently. But 
none of those justices wrote anything. Justice Ginsburg surely had 
something to do with that. She would have hesitated to write separately 
so as not to undermine the force of the Court’s ruling, and I suspect 
that one way or another she communicated her view to Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
Similarly, last term in Bostock v. Clayton County,31 which held that 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title 
VII, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a 6–3 Court, relying exclusively on 
textualism to interpret the statute. There are, of course, other 
approaches to statutory interpretation, but none of the liberal justices 
said anything about those alternatives—and I see the strategic hand of 
Justice Ginsburg there, too. 
During her time, most of the justices were appointed by Republican 
Presidents.32 Still, she wrote more than her share of opinions for the 
 
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), rev’g Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 
685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (“We are not final because 
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”); J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 
Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417 (1987) (reminding retired Justice Powell, who 
had asked to sit by designation on the Fourth Circuit, that “we get 
reversed”). 
30. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
31. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
32. She was the first Democratic appointee in 26 years, following 11 
consecutive Republicans. Appropriately, the last Democrat appointed 
before Justice Ginsburg was Thurgood Marshall, to whom her advocacy 
and legal strategy have often been compared. Indeed, President Clinton 
specifically compared the two when he announced his nomination of 
Justice Ginsburg. See Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg to Be a Supreme Court Associate Justice, 1 Pub. Papers 
842, 843 (June 14, 1993). 
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Court.33 Among them were important cases involving redistricting,34 
jurisdiction,35 environmental law,36 and copyright.37 Perhaps most 
notably, she wrote for the Court in United States v. Virginia,38 which 
struck down the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military 
Institute. 
But, like Justice Holmes, she will probably be best remembered for 
her dissents.39 One notable example is Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.,40 which rejected a claim of gender-based pay discrimination 
as untimely. Justice Ginsburg strongly disagreed with the majority’s 
 
33. One commentator said that Justice Ginsburg wrote more opinions for the 
Court than anyone else during her tenure. Adam Feldman, Empirical 
SCOTUS: Justice Ginsburg leaves a lasting legacy on the court, 
SCOTUSblog (Sept. 25, 2020, 4:22 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
 2020/09/empirical-scotus-justice-ginsburg-leaves-a-lasting-legacy-on-the-
court/#more-296444 [https://perma.cc/4D4C-L6XH]. Of course, only one 
other justice served during that full time-period. But based on the data 
provided by that commentator, it appears that only two of Justice 
Ginsburg’s 15 colleagues wrote more opinions for the Court on an annual 
basis. See id. (calculating based on Feldman’s data, the author found that 
only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, who was typically 
the swing justice, wrote more opinions for the Court than did Ginsburg 
on an annual basis). 
34. See, e.g., Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) 
(holding that one branch of a state legislature lacked standing to appeal in 
a redistricting case where the state’s attorney general declined to appeal); 
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (rejecting the argument that the 
Constitution requires states to draw legislative districts on the basis of 
citizen voting-age population rather than total population); Ariz. State 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the agency that voters approved to draw 
congressional districts). 
35. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (limiting the scope 
of general jurisdiction); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
544 U.S. 280 (2005) (taking a narrow view of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine). 
36. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (holding 
that the Clean Air Act displaced common law nuisance claims); Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) 
(recognizing the validity of citizen suits to enforce environmental statutes). 
37. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act). 
38. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
39. In fact, Justice Ginsburg was not an especially frequent dissenter. Justices 
Breyer, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas all wrote more dissents than she did 
during her tenure, and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Sotomayor, and Souter all 
had a higher number of dissenting opinions on an annual basis than did 
Ginsburg. See Feldman, supra note 33. 
40. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
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“parsimonious reading of Title VII,”41 explaining in detail why Lilly 
Ledbetter had filed her lawsuit on time and examining the workplace 
dynamics that make wage bias difficult to discover.42 She concluded by 
noting that it would be up to Congress to amend the statute to make 
clear that claims like Ledbetter’s were indeed timely.43 The Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was one of the first pieces of legislation 
passed by the Congress that convened in January of that year.44 
Another came in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,45 which held 
that closely held corporations whose owners had sincere religious 
objections were entitled to exemption from all or part of the contra–
ceptive mandate under the Affordable Care Act. Justice Ginsburg 
dissented, emphasizing that the employers’ position “would override 
significant interests of the corporations’ employees and covered 
dependents. It would deny legions of women who do not hold their 
employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA would 
otherwise secure.”46 
Perhaps her highest-profile dissent was in Shelby County v. Holder,47 
which invalidated the formula in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act.48 This ruling eviscerated the preclearance provisions contained in 
section 5.49 She challenged Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in 
virtually every particular. As she put it: “Throwing out preclearance 
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory 
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you 
are not getting wet.”50 
IV 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a unique figure in American history. If 
she had never served on the Supreme Court, Ginsburg would still have 
been a person of enormous importance. She was a leading legal scholar 
who wrote major works about procedure, jurisdiction, comparative law, 
and constitutional law. She was also the architect of a litigation 
 
41. Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 649–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
44. Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(3) (2018)). 
45. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
46. Id. at 745–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
47. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
48. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2018). 
49. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018). 
50. 570 U.S. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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campaign that resulted in a series of Supreme Court rulings that 
fundamentally transformed the law of gender discrimination. Her 
scholarship put her in the first rank of the legal academy, and her legal 
advocacy transformed a vital area of the law to our lasting benefit. 
Then she went on to contribute enormously to the law on the bench. 
She was not only, as Chief Justice Roberts put it, “a jurist of historic 
stature.”51 She was also a scholar of historic stature and a lawyer of 
historic stature. Nobody can replace her. 
 
51. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Statements from the Supreme Court 
Regarding the Death of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Sept. 
19, 2020) (emphasis added), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
 press/pressreleases/pr_09-19-20 [https://perma.cc/5LRW-VKHY]. 
